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The Micro-Politics of a New Mental Condition: 
Legitimization in Maladaptive Daydreamers' Discourse 
 
Orit Bershtling and Eli Somer 
University of Haifa, Israel 
 
This study illuminates legitimization efforts in the discourse of individuals who 
suffer from excessive, uncontrolled daydreaming: a contested mental condition 
that has not yet been recognized by the medical establishment. It aims to explore 
the rhetorical maneuvers employed by these “Maladaptive Daydreamers” in 35 
email exchanges with the second author and two petitions, submitted to the 
American Psychiatric Association and to the UK Parliament, with a demand for 
recognition. Our analysis, anchored theoretically and methodologically in 
Critical Discourse Analysis, identified several verbal strategies employed by 
the participants to persuade their interlocutors about the realness of their 
suffering. The main strategies were clustered into three dimensions: (1) 
professional—appealing to the audience’s professional identity as scientist-
practitioner and presenting shared knowledge; (2) social—forming a joint 
consensus group, a coalition or a partnership; (3) psychological—appealing to 
the interlocutor’s emotions through gratitude, self-disclosure or humor. This 
bottom-up analysis, positions individuals’ claims as a starting point for 
knowledge-dissemination and institutional change and blurs the modern 
dichotomy between the objects and subjects of medical gaze. Keywords: 
Maladaptive Daydreaming, Medicalization, Discourse, Legitimization, 
Rhetoric 
  
 
Introduction 
 
In this article we focus on the voice of “lay” people who suffer from a contested 
syndrome and on their struggle for recognition and legitimation. “Maladaptive Daydreaming” 
(MD) is an absorptive and compulsive fantasy activity that causes distress because it interferes 
with social, academic, interpersonal or vocational functioning (Somer, 2002). The phenomenon 
was recently described as an excessive form of immersive daydreaming that produces not only 
a rewarding experience based on a created fantasy of a parallel reality, but also dysfunctionality 
and distress associated with persistent and recurrent fantasizing activity (Somer, Somer, & 
Jopp, 2016a). Internet users around the world have adopted this relatively new term to facilitate 
communication, confer collective identity and give meaning to their mutually distressing 
condition. Still, the existence of MD has yet to be acknowledged by the medical and 
psychological establishments. MDers have reported that their condition is often encountered 
with doubt or puzzlement by mental health practitioners (Somer, Somer, & Jopp, 2016b), and 
its descriptions and explanations are a matter of dispute (Zepps, 2015).  
To this end, we consider and further develop the model proposed by Livnat & Lewin 
(2016) - usually employed for the analysis of public political speeches - to explore the rhetorical 
maneuvers1, persuasive acts and verbal means used by individuals with daydreaming, 
(Maladaptive daydreamers, hence, MDers) to negotiate their viewpoint vis-à-vis claims 
emanating from skeptical authorities.  
                                                          
1 The use of the term “rhetorical maneuvers” follows post-structural thinking and emphasizes the role of language 
and discourse in processes of subject positioning. 
1984   The Qualitative Report 2018 
In this article, we examine the discourse of MDers by analyzing 35 email exchanges 
and two petitions submitted to the American Psychiatric Association and to the UK Parliament, 
demanding that MD be recognized as a mental disorder. Informed consent and ethics board 
approval were recruited. The main research questions are: What type of language do MDers 
use to certify their claims? How do they legitimize their subjective experiences and convince 
others that MD is a valid condition? In other words, we seek to examine the micro-political 
processes of medicalization - the bottom-up reification of MD and how it emerges from “lay” 
people’s accounts. By directing attention to the discourse of individuals and their demands for 
nosological classification and consequent treatment, we re-examine the social locations of 
medical knowledge and highlight the influence-possibilities of “lay” knowledge and its 
involvement in the construction of illness. 
 
Maladaptive Daydreaming 
 
The phenomenon of daydreaming is a highly prevalent mental activity experienced by 
almost everyone (Singer, 1966). It is thought to encompass almost half of all human thought 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), with hundreds of daydreaming sequences experienced daily 
(Klinger, 2009). Maladaptive daydreaming, on the other hand, was first described as an 
extensive and distressing fantasy activity that causes dysfunction (Somer, 2002). The 
interviewees in Somer’s seminal paper constituted a small clinical sample of socially 
withdrawn and functionally impaired individuals who had sought help for dissociative and 
personality psychopathology associated with aversive early life experiences. MD seemed to 
have initially represented a preference for disengagement from life’s pains by means of mood-
enhancing fantasies about an idealized self, companionship, intimacy, resourcefulness and 
power (Somer, 2002).  
Seven years later, the next research publication on MD was a single-case study that 
described the successful treatment of excessive daydreaming with 50 mg/day of fluvoxamine, 
an antidepressant believed to influence obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Schupak & 
Rosenthal, 2009). The authors also reported that “the patient discovered a website containing 
a surprising number of anonymous postings on the topic of excessive or uncontrolled 
daydreaming. Numerous posters described patterns and tendencies that appeared remarkably 
consistent with the patient’s experience” (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009, p. 291). This report is 
the first indication of the grassroots, consumer-driven action culminating in the process we 
analyze in this study. That India-based website addressed parenting concerns and featured an 
international interactive forum on daydreaming that has been part of a larger section on 
children’s behavioral problems (IndiaParenting.com; Jane Bigelsen, personal communication, 
March 6, 2016). Apparently, it was on this forum that the 2002 paper was initially mentioned 
and where internet users first adopted the term maladaptive daydreaming to communicate with 
each other about their nameless condition2.  
In 2011, Bigelsen and Schupak retrieved data from members of a MD cyber community 
and reported that “a host of online forums and web pages began to proliferate on which 
thousands of anonymous posters from around the world professed to have secretly suffered 
with these symptoms for years” (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011, p. 1634). This global interest in 
MD was also translated into coverage in the print and electronic media3, which according to 
                                                          
2 IndiaParenting triggered the term’s viral spread on the World Wide Web and the subsequent sprouting of 
numerous other online platforms disseminating knowledge about and providing peer-support for MD. 
3 Examples include an article in Scientific American (Glausiusz, 2014), a newspaper article in De Standaard, a 
Flemish daily newspaper published in Belgium (Le Blanc, 2015), a magazine article in The Atlantic (Bigelsen and 
Kelly, 2015), a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio show (Tremonti 2015), and articles in Men’s Health 
(Bonaguro, 2015), The Wall Street Journal (Reddy, 2016), the Israel daily newspapers Haaretz (Efrati, 2016) and 
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Kroll-Smith (2003), has growing significance in creating and conceptualizing medical 
phenomena by shaping public perceptions.  
In light of broad consumer interest in MD and its wide-ranging media coverage, The 
Huffington Post’s online television network, HuffPost Live, aired a scholars’ discussion on 
MD (Zepps, 2015) featuring Eric Klinger, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, University of 
Minnesota, a leading daydreaming scholar; Scott Barry Kaufman, Scientific Director, 
Imagination Institute, University of Pennsylvania; Jayne Bigelsen, a former maladaptive 
daydreamer and co-author of several papers on MD; and Eli Somer, an MD scholar. The show 
was titled “Is Excessive Daydreaming a Psychiatric Disorder?” and presented substantial 
disagreements. Klinger, for example, questioned the classification of MD, saying: “I feel very 
uncomfortable about pathologizing it… It is the underlying problem that really is the key here.” 
In an interview in the Wall Street Journal, Klinger reiterated his skepticism that MD should be 
its own separate mental condition: “I’m very reluctant to create a category for a mind-
wandering disturbance. Once you start psychopathologizing these things you can get yourself 
in trouble, because often normal mechanisms account for this” (Reddy, 2016). 
Skeptical views on MD were also voiced by experts in two other prominent news media. 
A recent Wall Street Journal story on MD featured Jonathan Schooler, a professor in the 
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 
Schooler stated: 
 
Whether it deserves its own distinct diagnosis and the degree to which it’s not 
just anything more than the extreme end of the distribution of mind-wandering 
is not clear to me. Frequent mind-wandering can be a symptom of a variety of 
other mental conditions, such as attention-deficit disorders and depression. 
(Reddy, 2016)  
 
A CNN report on MD recently quoted clinical psychologist Peter Kinderman of the University 
of Liverpool who said, “MD is a good example about wanting to apply the medical disease 
model to elements of the human experience… I would not create a new category of mental 
disorder for daydreams” (Pequenino, 2016). 
After publication of the second and third papers on MD (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011; 
Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009), two major interactive processes ensued: (1) Email traffic from 
members of the global MD community to the authors of the three published papers increased. 
The writers provided personal testimonies about their MD experiences, requested advice, urged 
the authors to promote research on MD and volunteered to take part in future MD research. (2) 
Scientific collaboration began between researchers who had independently been writing about 
MD: Jayne Bigelsen and her colleagues in the USA and Eli Somer and his research associates 
in Israel. This collaboration began with a series of in-depth Skype interviews that examined 
the nature of the MD experience (Somer, Somer, & Jopp, 2016a; Somer, Somer, & Jopp, 
2016b). It progressed to the development of an MD scale (Somer, Lehrfeld, Bigelsen, & Jopp, 
2016) and the presentation of data indicating that MD is a distinct mental disorder (Bigelsen, 
Lehrfeld, Jopp, & Somer, 2016)4. 
This brief history of MD is characterized by tensions between MDers’ distress on the 
one hand and experts’ bafflement on the other and by the interest of the media in this intriguing 
                                                          
the Jerusalem Post (Siegel-Itzkovich 2016), Radio New Zealand’s The Wireless (Kamm 2016), New York 
Magazine (Tsoulis-Reay 2016) and CNN (Pequenino, 2016) (sample retrieved from goo.gl/tZMElY on January 
6, 2017). 
4 The latest developments in this nascent field include the presentation of suggested diagnostic criteria for MD, 
the development of a structured clinical interview for MD and the demonstration that it can reliably differentiate 
between MDers and non-MDers and a study on the comorbidity of MD. 
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mental phenomenon. We described unique grassroots pressure on scholars to reify MD 
scientifically. We believe the initial micro-political processes associated with the emergence 
of a new psychological disorder are worthy of scientific exploration. In this article we examine 
how individuals struggling with an unknown mental condition work to obtain recognition and 
legitimization from the medical-scientific establishment. 
 
The Politics of Medical Knowledge 
 
When exploring the core literature on the social aspects of clinical knowledge, one 
cannot avoid noticing the dichotomous distinction between the “subjects” and the “objects” of 
the “medical gaze” (Conrad, 1992; Foucault, 1973, 1975, 1978; Freidson, 1972; Zola, 1972). 
According to these scholars, the ability of modern medicine to name diseases, label and classify 
people, and prescribe or proscribe patient behaviors bestows great social power upon 
professionals, setting them apart from “lay” people and confirming their greater knowledge 
and status. This given authority to define persons, conditions or problems in medical terms can 
turn people into objects to be controlled or treated by prevailing forms of knowledge owned by 
a few delegated subjects (Conrad, 1992; Conrad & Schneider, 1980; Foucault, 1973, 1975, 
1978; Freidson, 1972; Zola, 1972). The dominant medical framework clarifies and explains 
what people experience, validates their pain or distress and makes sense of the body (Clarke & 
James 2003; Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr 2013). It identifies treatment options and predicts 
outcomes, enables access to services, provides structure to a narrative of dysfunction and also 
imposes official order. A diagnosis gives the individual permission to be ill and reflects what 
society is prepared to accept as “normal” and what it feels should be treated (Conrad, 1992; 
Jutel, 2009).  
Still, alongside these suggested modes of objectification by which humans become 
subjected to the medical gaze, Foucault (1982) notes that power can also be manifested in 
patients’ capacity to resist the attempt to master their forms of knowledge. Thus, power can 
also turn them into “subjects” who resist medicine’s monopoly over the right to define health 
and illness. Although institutional clinical psychology and medicine remain potent factors in 
the day-to-day lives of ordinary people, we are witnessing a permeative process in which the 
psycho-medical authorities, with their hierarchical procedures of observation, categorization 
or judgment, are now unavoidably being democratized and at times challenged (Conrad, 2005; 
Douglas, 2017). This process marks the end of the era of mutual engagement between the 
supervisors and the supervised (Bauman, 2000).  
These fundamental changes in the organization of medicine are not articulated in a 
vacuum, separated from other social concerns. First, we have been witness to a growing distrust 
of established experts, which is magnified by our culture’s ambivalent attitude toward the 
institutions of science and medicine. Postmodernist perspectives have raised troubling 
questions about the role of science in a world stripped of the old warrants of reason and truth 
(Lyotard, 1984). Second, in an era characterized by neo-liberal values, “lay” people become 
“buyers of health services” or “informed consumers,” while physicians are now regarded as 
employees or service providers who are expected to deliver satisfactory work performance. 
Under such circumstances, patients are on a more equal footing with their doctors, who are 
more prone to acknowledge their limitations and are both aware and critical of the proliferation 
of psychiatric categories (Conrad, 1992; Epstein, 2007; Halpin, 2016). Finally, expert 
knowledge is now procurable. Information previously restricted to medical authorities is 
currently available to “lay” web surfers, who can acquire knowledge and change the way they 
experience themselves or grasp the world around them (Conrad & Barker, 2010; Cotten, 2001). 
The doctor-patient relationship has become a meeting of experts, with patients more willing to 
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challenge their doctors, dispute their findings or seek advice from alternative services outside 
the doctor’s office (Lupton, 1997; Nettleton, 2004).  
These “educated patients” can also use the web to join advocacy groups that challenge 
medical authority, demand a say in how health professionals conceptualize their illness and 
battle for recognition or funding (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004; Langdridge, 2016). A growing 
number of internet communities form the grounds for social membership and the basis for 
staking citizenship claims (Epstein, 2007). These communities offer a means of survival for 
sufferers of medically unexplained symptoms and provide alternative networks of support 
(Dumit, 2006). They confer collective identity and create their own separate and distinct 
medical culture, one that assigns primary importance to the role of subjective experience 
(Goldstein, 2004 cited in Jutel, 2009). Furthermore, influential health consumer interest groups 
that have developed globally, such as the website of the Britain-based “Experts by Experience,” 
provide the NHS, hospitals, universities, professional bodies or third sector organizations with 
a range of services with respect to best practices in mental health Experts by Experience, n.d.). 
In this new era of distribution of knowledge, it will be interesting to explore the 
discourse and resistance practices of MDers when a diagnosis is absent, thus impugning the 
medical legitimacy of their complaints. Instead of focusing on large-scale struggle, we use a 
micro analysis model to examine the verbal means and rhetorical maneuvers through which 
individuals position themselves within the frame of medical discourse and claim recognition 
and rights. 
 
Persuasive Acts and Legitimacy Struggles for a New Diagnosis 
 
Clinical psychology and medicine are indeed more likely targets of “lay” intervention 
than are other more private and remote domains of scientific practice. It is a site of debate and 
critique as long as its implications are relevant to the public and to policy-making (Douglas, 
2017). The health of one’s mind and body is an issue of considerable salience to most people, 
and there is a substantial history of political struggles around the nature, causes and treatments 
of disease (Bury, 1991; Epstein, 1996; Rose, 2001).  
According to Epstein (1996), organized groups of patients differ in how they approach 
medical discourse. Some groups are essentially negative and distrustful, rejecting medical 
knowledge outright and advancing their own claims and different epistemological standpoints. 
Others ultimately just want to show that science and truth are on their side, seeking to acquire 
the cachet of medical authority for themselves by finding the expert who will validate their 
given stance. Other groups try to stake out some ground on the scientists’ own terrain and 
wrangle with scientists on issues of truth and method, positioning themselves on the inside as 
experts in their own right. In this process of “expertification” they do not devalue scientific 
knowledge, but rather seek to re-value knowledge that professional science has excluded 
(Epstein, 1996). 
For example, Scott (1990) showed how organized “lay” interests frequently play a 
significant role in the social construction of disease, as in the case of Vietnam veterans and the 
PTSD diagnosis. In the case of PTSD, those with control over classificatory processes needed 
to be brought to confront the legitimacy of this mental condition through concerted and 
repeated efforts. These efforts, which involved choosing how to speak about the disorder, with 
whom to discuss it, when to have those discussions and how to use collective action, eventually 
resulted in its inclusion in the DSM-III (Quosh & Gergen, 2008; Scott, 1990).  
Brown (2008) argued that defining diseases is often like a turf war, with individuals 
and groups with different interests scrambling to establish the authenticity of their claims or of 
their expertise. These tensions can be present between laypeople and the representatives of 
medical/psychological science. According to Epstein (1996), who explored the unusual 
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politicization of AIDS in the United States since the early 1980s, knowledge emerges out of 
credibility struggles. Credibility describes the capacity of claims-makers to enroll supporters 
behind their arguments, legitimate those arguments as authoritative knowledge and present 
themselves as the sort of people who can voice the truth … The credibility of any knowledge 
claim can depend on who advances it, who is an “expert” and who is a “layperson,” and what 
sort of evidence is invoked to support it (Epstein, 1996). 
Latour (1983, 1987) assumed that the process of recognizing new scientific knowledge 
and accepting it as true or valid is basically a process of persuasion. He noted that just as 
scientists may enroll laypeople in support of scientific facts, so too may laypeople attempt to 
enlist scientists to their cause. Thus, the process of medicalization is not simply a result of the 
“medical imperialism” of professionals. Patients are not just passive objects of scientific 
inquiry but can be active participants in this process (Conrad, 1992).  
Language is a crucial resource in the process of persuasion and legitimation of one’s 
distress. It is not merely descriptive but also performative, and it bestows power to influence 
and construct meaning. According to Van Leeuwen (2009), language is a kind of a tool kit for 
performing various social practices. It has a functional aspect and it is recruited for rhetorical 
intentions of speakers who wish to accomplish different social goals (e.g., positive self-
positioning in interaction). Thus, Van Leeuwen’s approach - anchored theoretically in systemic 
functional linguistics developed by Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) - ascribes agency 
and capability to individuals and social actors.  
What possibilities are there for laypeople to involve themselves meaningfully in the 
process of “doing medicine”? How do MDers use language to define the problem at hand and 
reinforce their claims? In this article we adopted an analytical model – usually employed to 
analyze public political speeches – to explore the linguistic ways in which MDers rhetorically 
construct their unrecognized mental health problem for the purpose of persuasion and reality 
change. Furthermore, unlike most above-mentioned authors who view the shifts in medical and 
institutional power from a macro perspective, emphasizing the role of social movements or 
laypeople’s collective actions, in this article we attempt to focus on a less examined 
dimension—the individuals and the micro-political processes in their struggle to turn their 
suffering into a medical issue. We hope this analysis will shed further light on the conceptual 
level of medicalization in the post-modern era. 
 
Study Context 
 
Orit Bershtling: As a scholar of discourse studies I attended a departmental colloquium 
presented by Eli Somer on emerging evidence for an unrecognized mental condition he termed 
“maladaptive daydreaming.” Beyond the scientific evidence presented, what caught my 
attention were his comments on the ongoing discourse he had been holding with countless 
individuals from across the world who volunteered information about their distress, sought his 
advice and offered their assistance in promoting his research in the field. In initiating this study, 
my aim was to explore ways in which individuals struggling with a seemingly obscure mental 
health problem interact with a scientist-practitioner who is interested in their condition, in an 
attempt to promote curative knowledge. 
Eli Somer: Since my first description of MD (Somer, 2002) I have been inundated with 
communications from many countries requesting information and guidance about ways of 
coping with MD. What had begun as a trickle of messages evolved into a barrage of emails that 
had signaled a genuine grassroot appeal to the scientific community to boost research in this 
embryonic field. This bottom-up consumer pressure had spurred a number of international 
research collaborations that has already resulted in several published papers. Currently, I have 
a waiting list of over 700 self-diagnosed MDers who volunteered to take part in future studies. 
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This paper is a tribute to countless of persistent sufferers who have added extra drive to my 
scientific motivation. 
 
Method 
 
This study aimed to explore one of the crucial uses of language: the process of 
legitimation, which stems (in this context) from MDers’ personal experiences in everyday life. 
These personal testimonies and acts of persuasion are better captured by means of qualitative 
inquiry, grounded theoretically and methodologically in Critical Discourse Analysis. This 
method seeks to show how language can be used as an ideological instrument; as a part of the 
way that people promote particular ideas, values or views of the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994; Johnstone, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012). 
 
Data and Participants 
 
We examined the language used by MDers by means of two data sets. The first set 
included 35 email exchanges (2010-2016) of MDers (aged 18-63) who had contacted the 
second author in response to scientific and media publications on MD and online discussions. 
We sampled messages from individuals who included unsolicited statements of interest to 
provide personal information for current and future MD research. Some messages also 
contained requests for information and advice. These emails arrived from Austria, Argentina, 
Brazil, Britain, Egypt, Germany, India, Netherlands, Norway and the USA. Because this was 
a retrospective analysis of an existing database, available demographic details were limited. 
We also analyzed two submitted petitions. Both appeals demanded recognition of MD as a 
mental disorder and were submitted during 2015-2016 to the American Psychiatric Association 
(Reed, n.d.) and to the UK Parliament (Petitions, UK Government and Parliament, n.d.).  
 
Ethics 
 
The study was authorized by the institutional ethics committee, and the participants’ 
full names were substituted by their initials. In line with research on existing datasets, the ethics 
committee waived the requirement for informed consent because it was convinced that: (1) The 
research involved no risk to the subjects, (2) Participants proactively consented to provide 
personal information for MD research, (3) Participant identifying detail was concealed or 
deleted, and (4) The waiver would not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
The various texts differed in length and in the chosen ways of representing personal 
and family history. Because the petitions addressed a more skeptical audience, they contained 
fewer personal descriptions and focused more on figures and quotes of others. Emails 
addressed to the MD researchers frequently opened with a personal introduction and proceeded 
to describe the course of their condition: when it started; how it developed; the circumstances 
associated with its exacerbation; the frequency of its major symptoms; the amount of time 
invested in MD; the impact of MD on daily functioning; and descriptions of unsuccessful 
attempts to get help. These email messages typically ended with a brief epilogue containing 
both a request for information and a plea for help, as well as offers to participate in future 
research and assist in promoting MD as a recognized mental condition. Some writers offered 
explanations regarding the etiology of their MD, typically utilizing clinical discourse to anchor 
it in their early childhoods. 
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Beyond the above content analysis, we aimed to explore modes of language use - such 
as lexical preferences, ways of justification (e.g., personal stories or statistics), use of pronouns, 
adjectives or inclusions - and its rhetorical function in MDers’ effort to convince their target 
audiences in the two data sets that MD is a valid condition. In doing so, our premise was that 
the process of persuasion contains strategies that foster dialogic interaction with the 
interlocutor. In other words, rhetoric serves as a unifying process that unites speaker and 
listener and shapes the quality of their relationship. The degree of the elicited emotional 
identification generated in the target audience determines the influential power obtained by the 
interlocutor (Burke 1969; Perelman 1982). Hence, in our qualitative analysis of the utilized 
verbal strategies, we adopted the model suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016). We sought to 
examine whether and how MDers foster interaction with the interlocutors as they try to bring 
them closer to their point of view. We also sought to explore whether and how MDers evoke 
sympathetic feelings by appealing to shared values and by identifying a common denominator. 
In their analysis of verbal strategies, Livnat & Lewin identified three main domains that we 
elaborate on below: forming social bonds, building a consensus, and revealing ideology 
(2016). Table 1 shows the linguistic strategies and their domains that were pertinent to our 
study. Further elaborations are introduced in the findings section. 
 
Table 1. Linguistic strategies and their domains 
(The provided illustrations were derived from MDers’ communications) 
Example Strategy Sub-domain Domain 
Thanks to you, I now know… 
(M.H.) 
Expression of gratitude Positive speech 
actions towards 
the addressee 
1. Forming 
social bonds 
between 
interlocutor and 
addressee  
 
Sir, you are the father of MD (S.S.) 
Thank you even more for your 
impressive work (C.A.) 
Expression of praise 
Hi Mr. X Informal addressing 
I had a very traumatic, abusive 
childhood which led to a lifetime of 
loneliness and sadness (B.G.) 
Disclosure of sensitive 
autobiographical information 
Self-disclosure 
MD is ruining my life (J.Z.) 
You are my last hope for a decent 
life (L.E.) 
I have been always very ashamed 
(A.A.) 
Please help me! (D.D.)  
Disclosure of emotion 
I was so happy to find someone who 
understands my condition (S.N.) 
Building a consensus based 
on the recognition of shared 
values  
 2. Building a 
consensus 
All my hair stood up as you started 
to describe my struggle (J.W.) 
Building a common action-
oriented denominator  
I’m sure I don’t have to explain to 
you how frustrating it is (A.L.) 
But, as you know, it can be rather 
difficult (C.A.)  
Building a consensus based 
on shared knowledge 
I play by their rules and take the 
pills (Y.B.) 
Building a consensus based 
on irony towards a third party 
I strongly believe… (M.T.)  Revealing a position by using 
verbs of knowledge and will 
 3. Revealing 
ideological 
position I would like to contribute (L.E.) Expression of intent 
 
The Livnat and Lewin model was originally constructed for analyzing political speeches. The 
texts we analyzed related to individuals’ efforts to legitimize a yet unrecognized condition that, 
in their cases, had often been dismissed or misdiagnosed. We therefore regarded the written 
messages as typical rhetorical texts, not unlike political speeches. The following quotes 
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represent MDers’ endeavors to convince their interlocutors that their symptoms were real and 
similar to those described in published studies or in online MD communities: 
 
I am articulate and able to express myself with confidence (S.J., February 2016). 
 
I’d be a perfect candidate (S.F., December 2015). 
 
You probably receive a lot of emails and it`s understandable that you can`t reply 
to all, but I would really appreciate it, if you would be able to, because I feel 
that I have nowhere else to turn (B.C., January 2016). 
 
The reason I believe my case could help you get the disorder recognized is 
because my entire history of arrests and hospital visits all centered around 
maladaptive daydreaming, and there is extensive documentation of a lot of 
things that happened (C.A, August 2016). 
 
By describing their attributes (“able to express myself,” “perfect candidate”), their desperation 
(“I have nowhere else to turn”) or their well-documented medical history, MDers 
communicated their conviction that they meet the MD diagnostic criteria and are entitled to 
participate in MD research and receive counseling for their plight. 
 
Trustworthiness 
 
The analysis was performed through two complementary levels: content and form 
(modes of language use). This cross-level analysis (triangulation) enabled us to control the 
range of interpretations to MDers’ texts and strengthened our findings (Denzin, 1989; Yardley, 
2000). Furthermore, the co-operation between two researchers, reading the same texts and 
analyzing it together, helped to verify our results. 
 
Results: The Rhetorical Maneuvers of MDers 
 
We divided quotes extracted from MDers’ statements and communications into the 
three domains suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016): forming social bonds, consensus 
building, and revealing ideological position. The three domains encompass nine rhetorical 
strategies aimed at creating and fostering interlocutor-audience solidarity. Notably, some 
participants used a number of linguistic means in parallel. Below we present some prominent 
illustrations of these employed strategies. 
 
1. Forming social bonds 
 
Four main verbal strategies illustrate the formation of social bonds between 
interlocutor/writer and addressee/reader: expression of gratitude, disclosure of emotion, 
disclosure of personal information, and use of humor or irony. MDers applied each of these 
strategies to create a sense of closeness to the reader by demonstrating the level of their distress 
or by clarifying their willingness to contribute to a common goal: the advancement of future 
research in the field as a means of endowing MD with scientific validation.  
Expression of gratitude. In their email messages participants tend to start the dialogue 
by thanking their interlocutors and creating a bond around a joint effort. I.H. writes: “First off, 
I would like to thank you, for giving a name and recognition to something I have been suffering 
from for so long without having any proof that it was a thing” (I.H., July 2015).  
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Like many other writers, I.H. (who did not disclose her age or place of residence) opens 
her text with an expression of gratitude. She thanks the reader for identifying the nameless 
symptoms she had been suffering from for so long and for concretizing something that 
medically had been so amorphous. That “thing” or that “something,” as she phrases it, evolves 
now into a potentially valid diagnosis that can explain her personal distress.  
B.G., a 63-year-old American woman, opens her message with a simile and 
complements the message of the previous interlocutor: 
 
It was as if I was struck by lightning. For the first time I became aware of the 
fact that there were other people who did what I did and I felt somewhat 
heartened that I now have a name for this horrible obsession (B.G., June 2016).  
 
The writer thanks the reader for labeling the “obsession” she has been suffering from. She helps 
the reader understand the nature of her suffering by describing it as an obsession—a more 
familiar disorder. Her choice of words, her use of the adjective “horrible” to describe her 
suffering and her comparison of the realization that there were other people with a similar 
problem to a lightning strike all add, in line with Gee’s writing (2011), a dramatic effect to her 
gratitude and convey the powerful impact of the discovery of MD on her quality of life. The 
employment of this communication tactic seems not to diminish the sincerity of her expressed 
gratitude; rather, it suggests that the interlocutor employs a parallel rhetorical action. She points 
out to the reader that the subject of her gratitude is as important to her as it is to him, thereby 
emphasizing their common denominator and enhancing their sense of shared goals (Chilton, 
1990). 
Disclosure of emotion. The disclosure of emotions can accentuate the message and 
help forge the bond between interlocutor and addressee. Expressing emotion enhances intimacy 
in the dialogue and narrows the gap between writer and addressee. It is a key in the 
legitimization process, because it prepares the audience to accept and support the social actor’s 
stance or certain perceptions of reality (Reyes, 2011b).  
J.Z., a 20-year-old German student, writes: 
 
MD is ruining my life. It’s always there, every second of the day. It’s like a 
parasite in my brain and I just can’t get rid of it. However, when I experience 
what I call‚ moments of silence (when suddenly my‚ inner TV shuts off) I am 
overcome by a drastic fear and always start crying uncontrollably. It is taking 
me apart slowly (J.Z., January 2016). 
 
The writer’s choice of words and images reflects the sense of urgency that accompanies her 
distress (“ruining,” “parasite,” “rid of it”). The evocative effect is intensified by the repetitive 
emphasis on the frequency with which she experienced the symptoms (“always,” “every 
second”), thereby eliciting empathy for her plight (Machin and Mayr, 2012). 
Another young woman writes the words “Need help” in her message’s subject line. 
This is how she describes her experience: 
 
...Please… please... please... sir give me some clue... how can I overcome this 
disorder …….plzz sir I need help........I am only 18 years old.....and a 
helpless..... I know this is my last hope......I need some help......I will be waiting 
for your kind response (S.S., October 2010). 
 
This excerpt clearly demonstrates how text form underscores text content. The fragmentary 
nature of the script, the multiple use of ellipses, the repetitive pleas for help (please=4, help=3), 
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the desperate search for a clue to her recovery and the mention of her young age (18) all 
enhance the writer’s conveyed sense of vulnerability aimed at evoking the reader’s feelings 
and serve as catalysts for swift action (Gee, 2011; Livnat & Lewin, 2016). 
To convey their intense distress, writers often employed metaphors to describe their 
disengagement from their external worlds and the conflicts associated with their mental habits 
(e.g., “the war in my own mind” S.J., February 2016; “I get lost in my head” A.R., May 2016; 
“minute to minute struggle” J.W., October 2014). The “war,” “loss” and “struggle” metaphors 
evoke emotions that may elicit a mental or behavioral response from the interlocutor (Reyes, 
2011b). 
 
Disclosure of personal information. 
 
Imagine this: you are a student, failing your classes because instead of doing 
your homework you need to go to the park … simply to daydream on the swing 
… and you can’t get help. Why not? Because it’s not an official disorder 
(petition submitted to the American Psychiatric Association, Change.org, n. d.). 
 
This excerpt from the petition utilizes another persuasion strategy seemingly aimed at fostering 
intimacy with the addressee and at narrowing any gaps between interlocutors and their audience 
by means of disclosure of personal accounts designed to reify this elusive, unfamiliar 
psychological phenomenon. According to Wodak and Van Leeuwen (1999), the personal 
account serves as evidence. It frames the phenomenon in question, providing it with a more 
well-defined dimension of time and place. Thus, it helps validate the writers’ state of mind and 
justifies the call for recognizing MD as a condition that affects the course and quality of their 
lives.  
A.A., a 34-year-old Argentinian woman, demonstrates how a personal disclosure 
contributes to fostering a bond between the interlocutor and her addressee: “I have been always 
very ashamed to even mention them (MD symptoms) to anyone, I felt it was embarrassing and 
kept them completely private” (A.A., Aug 2015). 
A.A. keeps her MD story secret from her relatives and acquaintances. She feels 
embarrassed divulging it to them. In this email she discloses her secret for the first time, thus 
transforming the reader into an exclusive confidant and ally and fostering the necessary 
bilateral bond (Reyes, 2011a). 
Use of humor or irony. 56-year-old A.P.C from Britain and 28-year-old A.R. from the 
USA present a fourth verbal strategy for establishing an unmediated connection between writer 
and addressee—the use of humor. A.P.C writes: “I sometimes wish I’d done my doctorate in 
psychology rather than chemistry! L.O.L” (A.P.C., September 2015). He expresses laughter 
and ends his message by wondering about the course of studies he has chosen. A.R. describes 
how after writing the letter she is going to waste her time by staring aimlessly at a bottle (“I’m 
now off to examine a plastic bottle in awe for several hours!” A.R., May 2016).  
According to Ungar (1984), the use of humor serves as an ice breaker. It can blunt 
embarrassment associated with the uncovering of personal flaws without tarnishing self-
respect. This strategy neutralizes the reader’s critical nature and intensifies empathic feelings 
towards the writer. 
 
2. Building a consensus 
 
A second domain of verbal strategies aimed at persuading an audience and at promoting 
solidarity is consensus building. This domain includes three rhetorical strategies that bind 
interlocutor and addressee in one common denominator: referring to shared beliefs or values, 
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referring to shared knowledge, and partnership and coalition building. These strategies evoke 
agreement and subsequently motivate the addressee to take the desired action. 
Referring to shared beliefs or values. The attitude towards time in Western capitalist 
cultures, which most respondents were part of, is a shared value. The construct of time has 
evolved under capitalism into a resource designated to serve a worthy objective. Individuals 
are expected to utilize their time resources effectively, make pragmatic decisions concerning 
their course of study or career and demonstrate organizational skills, persistence and 
responsibility (Marcuse, 1972). Such expectations are reflected in the repeated mention of time 
wasted on daydreaming and in the use of time-related metaphors (e.g., “I am running out of 
time!!!!” D.M., Nov. 2010). Not only do these metaphors represent cultural values that 
associate time and performance, they also transform the abstract idea of time into a more 
concrete concept (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For example, I.H. writes: “Due to maladaptive 
daydreaming all the time, days go by where I don’t get any work done” (I.H., June 2016). A. 
A. adds: “I could not even calculate the amount of time that I have spent daydreaming” (A.A., 
Aug. 2015).  
The performance principle reigns in capitalist societies, and associated rationality, self-
discipline and the propensity to acquire intellectual, material and experience resources are also 
treasured (Marcuse, 1972). Most MDers contrast the real material world with their fantasy 
world and link their MD to treading water and underachieving relative to their peers: 
 
… It has affected me a lot; affected my education, my motivation, my personal 
relationships. I don’t see any appeal to the real life. I lost all motivation and 
ambition …It feels like my life is on hold, and life doesn’t wait for anyone. 
People my age are evolving and improving, and I’m here, unable to let go of my 
fantasy world to focus on the actual person that I am (I.H., July 2015). 
 
The writers appear to use these shared societal values - the performance principle and the 
reverence for time – to legitimize their standpoint. When they comment on their time wasting 
or compromised performance as outcomes of MD, they narrow the psychological distance 
between them and their addressees, thereby justifying the need for joint action to eradicate the 
problem. 
Referring to shared knowledge. Another approach to promoting rapprochement and 
reducing the hierarchy between writers and readers is associated with the attempt to 
demonstrate shared knowledge: 
 
I have a master’s degree in social work, so I am fairly knowledgeable about 
mental illness and human behavior. I would be very interested in talking to you 
or other professionals about my experience. I believe that there needs to be more 
awareness of this problem in order to help people who suffer (J.T., October 
2014). 
 
In the excerpt above, J.T., a 48-year-old woman, self-diagnosed with MD, describes her 
relevant education and emphasizes her thorough familiarity with the nuances of clinical 
discourse. She makes no mention of her own difficulties but rather stresses her willingness to 
help others and to contribute from her own knowledge and personal experience. Thus, 
legitimization is constructed in her discourse by persuading the audience that her actions will 
benefit others (Reyes, 2011b). 
36-year-old D.M. also finds a way to show the common knowledge she shares with her 
readers: “Unlike your subjects, I have never suffered at the hands of an abuser … Just like your 
subjects, I am not married” (D.M., November 2010). It seems as if D.M. negotiates with her 
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reader’s accumulated knowledge. She hints that she read one of Somer’s papers, compares her 
experiences to those of participants in his past research and advises the reader that the MD 
community is probably more heterogeneous than that described in his seminal paper on MD 
(Somer, 2002), to include individuals like her who had never experienced childhood trauma. 
Most MDers describe a process of self-exploration and a keen wish to learn more about their 
troubling condition. They do this by employing clinical discourse, thus exposing their 
familiarity with medical and psychological language and vocabulary, a familiarity they tend to 
point out. This heeded, thoughtful process presents them as rational and knowledgeable, thus 
validating their stance.  
The petition submitted to the APA even quoted the medical definition of mental illness 
verbatim: “The very definition of mental illness is, and I quote: ‘any of a broad range of medical 
conditions’” (Petition written by M.R. to APA). The mentioned medical text is integrated in a 
persuasive rhetorical maneuver geared to validate the mental condition of the signatories and 
to provide supportive evidence for their potentially contested standpoint. It also produces a 
dialogue between equals and moderates likely differences in status (Abell & Myers, 2008). 
This is accomplished by presenting the rationale for reparative action and by evoking readers’ 
empathy and moving them closer to understanding the MDer perspective. 
Partnership and coalition building. We identified a third verbal strategy 
characterized by the effort to establish an action-oriented coalition. 
 
I am not emailing you to complain. I want to help you in any way I can. I can 
research legal implications of the classification of MD as a disorder, or anything 
else you would like. I would also be interested in participating in a study (K.B., 
June 2016). 
 
K.B. informally addresses the reader (“Hi Mr. X”) in a message that bears the words “I want 
to help” in the subject line. She positions herself in the role of “helper” rather than “helped” 
and as an active rather than a passive partner in a campaign to promote public awareness of 
MD. K.B. creates a sense of reciprocity in her message. She is not a mere research subject, but 
rather possesses unique knowledge of the law, an intellectual resource that complements the 
reader’s clinical knowledge. She suggests that she can help the reader expand the knowledge 
on MD and implies a benefit for her.  
The desired partnership is also advocated as a coalition against a third party. S.F. writes 
in an email: “But, armed with your recent article, at least I have something to hand over to a 
therapist and say: “ditto for me---sums it up perfectly” (S.F., Dec 2015). Y.B. also assembles 
a coalition against his psychiatrists: “Therefore, I am writing to ask for help. Psychiatrists just 
throw me in a classical bin (Bipolar I is the diagnostic du jour). I play by their rules and take 
the pills” (Y.B., January 2016). 
In their messages, S.F., an American attorney, and Y.B., also from the USA, seems to 
form a coalition with their readers as they ironically refer to their current therapists. While Y.B. 
accepts his psychiatric diagnosis and choses to cooperate with his doctors, S.F. seems to be 
more active and plans to confront his incredulous clinician with a paper written by his 
addressee. The metaphor in the verb “armed” is infused with a double meaning: by submitting 
the paper to his doctor he hopes to secure an accurate diagnosis and better treatment. At the 
same time, he seems to want to “fight” his erring therapists with more effective new “weapons” 
he acquired from his audience.  
In the analyzed discourse we identified an additional approach to coalition building—
the use of the pronoun “we”: “Since we can’t call it disorder, I do believe it’s a coping 
mechanism though” (I.H., Jul 2015). By utilizing first person plural, I.H. positions herself close 
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to her reader’s viewpoint and establishes a joint reference group with him that is committed to 
a common cause (Malone 1997). 
 
3. Revealing ideological position 
 
Finally, the third domain suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016) concerns the 
expression of an ideological or personal stance. We identified two prominent verbal strategies 
that reflect this third domain and are employed to persuade the reader to accept the writer’s 
arguments: personal evaluation and provided analogies to well-known medical diagnoses. 
Evaluation. Evaluation is an act of meaning given to a particular subject. It reveals the 
writer’s position on what is regarded as “good” or “bad,” “normal” or “deviant.” Evaluations 
encapsulate social presuppositions and involve elements of critique and rationale for action 
(Van Leeuwen, 2009). One example of an evaluation that discloses a personal stance is 
manifested in the words of S.N., an 18-year old girl from India: “I am completely aware of my 
surroundings and can differentiate between reality and a daydream ... I am perfectly normal 
(S.N., November 2015). S.N. seems to self-diagnose, while her verbal choices signal high 
modality - a high degree of certainty about the evaluation of her mental condition 
(“completely”; perfectly”):  
S.F. also engages in evaluation of his condition and the onset of his symptoms: “I have 
been a fantasizer, dreamer, day dreamer since around age five. My father would always say 
jovially: ahh, S.F., you’re a dreamer” (S.F., December 2015). He quotes his father to strengthen 
a stance aimed at persuading the reader (Van Leeuwen, 2009). Furthermore, in line with Wodak 
and Van Leeuwen’s ideas (1999), by evaluating the course of his condition as long-standing in 
duration, S.F. appears to depict it with an “air of objectivity.” His MD began when he was very 
young, and it prevails through the present time. In other words, MD has always been a part of 
him.  
Another example of an evaluation and of revealing an ideological position is embodied 
in the message of 18-year-old A.S. from Britain: “I would love to see this phenomenon given 
scientific acknowledgement and I would also love to get to the bottom of what has affected me 
and evidently thousands of others our whole lives” (A.S., June 2016). A.S. presents her positive 
stance towards the study of MD and its hypothesized contribution to the advancement of 
knowledge about the phenomenon. Her position is based on prior social assumptions and on 
the perception that generating scientific knowledge is essential for understanding any particular 
medical problem. Her use of the verb “love” indicates a positive appraisal and connotes her 
intention and will to act towards advancing the cause she cherishes. Her justification for action 
is also based on the presented prevalence of MD. Her persuasive message and call for action is 
empowered by the thousands of MDers she is allegedly speaking for (Van Leeuwen, 2009). 
M.T. from the USA also estimates that the number of MD sufferers is large. She uses 
the verb “believe” as a seemingly objective rhetorical act aimed at recruiting the reader for 
joint action: “And I strongly believe there are a lot of people who suffer from it” (M.T., March 
2016). 
Analogy to a known medical diagnosis. I.H. draws an analogy between MD and 
substance abuse. She uses prior common knowledge about the effects of drug use and relates 
to a more familiar social phenomenon. She uses this comparison to render her unfamiliar 
symptoms more accessible to her audience:  
 
Another thing I would like to say about MD is that, even though I have never 
tried drugs, I think the pleasure it gives is similar to it. I hate how MD messes 
up my life, but there is nothing else that gives me as much pleasure as MD. I 
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feel a rush of happiness and satisfaction with it. And it’s so addictive … I can 
get instant gratification just by daydreaming (I.H., June 2016).  
 
I.H. explains that the immensely rewarding experience of MD is akin to drug use, as 
are MD’s negative consequences. To accentuate her analogy, the writer employs verbs of 
knowing and evaluation (think, hate) that may underscore her stance and illuminate her daily 
experience. These findings are in line with Armentor’s findings (2017) about the ways in which 
women with Fibromyalgia – a contested, stigmatized illness – communicate their illness with 
others. The women compared Fibromyalgia with a well-known illness, drawing upon existing 
knowledge to convince others and help them to understand their personal experiences. 
 
Discussion 
 
The persuasive strategies employed by MDers derive from an interpersonal discourse 
aimed at advancing awareness and recognition of MD as a mental health problem. The 
illustrations we provided represent the main verbal strategies used by MDers to influence their 
interlocutors along three dimensions: (1) the professional dimension—an appeal to the reader’s 
professional identity as a scientist-practitioner and the presentation of shared knowledge; (2) 
the social dimension—formation of a joint consensus group, coalition or partnership; and (3) 
the psychological dimension—an appeal to the reader’s emotions through gratitude, self-
disclosure or humor.  
This three-dimensional analysis can organize and enrich our view on the participants’ 
discursive practices and its functional capacities and highlight the multiple ways in which 
individuals can contest medical claims and demand legitimization to their health condition. 
Furthermore, our focus on micro-politics—the less explored dimension of the social 
construction of disease—complements observations on social movements, widespread political 
struggles, collective acts and organizational factors of disease discovery processes After all, 
the talk of people as they attempt to make sense of themselves and their distress may draw 
together the macro processes of medicalization and can eventually evolve into a venue for 
social change and resistance to medical authority. That is, resistance should not be reserved for 
visible, collective acts, but rather can be accomplished in smaller-scale dynamics of power and 
embodied in everyday-life acts.  
The documented rhetorical effort to mobilize the reader reveals the MDers’ active 
stances as both a source and an object of medical gaze. Our respondents were neither simply 
passive consumers of the medical discourse nor submissive victims of the biomedical machine. 
In their quest for a remedy for their unidentified trouble, MDers sought and obtained pertinent 
information, disseminated it, showed proficiency in professional terminology and knowledge 
in evidence-based medical discourse.  
Notably, the interpersonal undercurrents between MDers and members of the scientific-
professional community are atypical. It is usually mental health professionals and academics 
who disapprove of the medicalization of daydreaming and the imposition of constructs 
borrowed from the medical discourse on the description of excessive daydreaming. In the case 
of MD, the tables are turned. As cited in Wall Street Journal (Reddy, 2016), the doctors are 
conspicuously those who are reluctant to label a “normal” and prevalent phenomenon 
(daydreaming) as psychopathological, dreading the consequences of stigmatic labeling on the 
individual. Similarly, as opposed to the research attention that recently has turned to stigma 
resistance of people who have been labeled “mentally ill” (Link et al., 2002; Thoits & Link, 
2016), MDers strive for a “label,” which will confirm their mental condition. 
In other words, a significant part of the difficulties MDers are facing stems from the 
fact that they alone cannot produce credible clinical knowledge about effective treatments for 
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their condition. To generate clinical recognition and evidence-based treatment for MD medical 
knowledge must be jointly created from the mutual nourishing or diffusion of both parties. 
MDers and scientist-practitioners need to engage in discourse and jointly produce the texts that 
strongly mediate professional activity. Thus, we should examine different social actors and 
additional gazes pertinent to the exercise of power (Halpin 2016; Langdridge, 2016). By 
acknowledging that medical knowledge is constructed by socially situated claim-makers and 
other interested parties, we can bring greater critical awareness to the policy making process. 
After all, any policy response to a problem is determined by how the problem is defined or 
framed in the first place (Conrad & Barker, 2010). 
Self-representations of health and illness offer a strong counterbalance to the dominant 
biomedical focus. All knowledge about emotional and physical suffering stems from reports 
by individuals seeking remedy and healing (Epstein, 1996). Thus, the origins of all current 
diagnoses are rooted in laypersons’ complaints. Therefore, instead of sanctifying individual or 
expert ownership of knowledge, we should use the wisdom of crowds and the unique 
knowledge retained by community members as well as leverage expert collaboration. This is 
the key to developing a new understanding emanating from the intellectual encounter and 
bilateral fertilization. As Kroll-Smith (2003) mentioned, those who self-diagnose do not 
themselves threaten modern medical authority. Rather, they are exercising, if only 
momentarily, an alternative authority, one worth investigating. 
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